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Fault detection and isolation of malicious nodes
in MIMO Multi-hop Control Networks
A. D’Innocenzo, M.D. Di Benedetto and F. Smarra
Abstract— A MIMO Multi-hop Control Network (MCN) con-
sists of a MIMO LTI system where the communication between
sensors, actuators and computational units is supported by a
(wireless) multi-hop communication network, and data flow
is performed using scheduling and routing of sensing and
actuation data. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions
on the plant dynamics and on the communication protocol
configuration such that the Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI)
problem of failures and malicious attacks to communication
nodes can be solved.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networked control systems are spatially dis-
tributed control systems where the communication between
sensors, actuators, and computational units is supported by
a wireless multi-hop communication network. The use of
wireless Multi-hop Control Networks (MCNs) in industrial
automation results in flexible architectures and generally
reduces installation, debugging, diagnostic and maintenance
costs with respect to wired networks. Although MCNs offer
many advantages, co-design of the network configuration
and of the control algorithm for a MCN requires addressing
the joint dynamics of the plant and of the communication
protocol.
Recently, a huge effort has been made in scientific re-
search on Networked Control Systems (NCSs), see e.g.
[2], [25], [11], [24], [10], [8], [14] and references therein
for a general overview. In general, the literature on NCSs
addresses non–idealities (such as quantization errors, packets
dropouts, variable sampling and delay and communication
constraints) as aggregated network performance variables,
losing irreversibly the dynamics introduced by scheduling
and routing communication protocols. What is needed for
modeling and analyzing control protocols on MCNs is an
integrated framework for analysing/co-designing network
topology, scheduling, routing and control. In [1], a simu-
lative environment of computer nodes and communication
networks interacting with the continuous-time dynamics of
the real world is presented. To the best of our knowledge,
the first formal model of a Multi-hop Control Network
has been presented in [18], [19], where a mathematical
framework has been proposed that allows modeling the MAC
layer (communication scheduling) and the Network layer
(routing) of recently developed wireless industrial control
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protocols, such as WirelessHART and ISA-100. In [5] we
extended the formalism proposed in [19] by defining a MCN
M, that consists of a continuous-time SISO LTI plant P
interconnected to a controller C via two (wireless) multi-hop
communication networks GR (the controllability network)
and GO (the observability network), as illustrated in Figure
1, and by modeling redundancy in data communication - i.e.
sending actuation/sensing data via multiple paths and then
merging these components according to a weight function.
This approach, which can be interpreted as a form of network
coding at the level of the application layer of the ISO/OSI
protocol stack, is called multi-path routing (or flooding, in the
communication scientific community) and aims at enabling
the detection and isolation of node failures and malicious
intrusions, which cannot be done using single-path routing or
strategies that use timestamps to discard redundant packets.
It is well known that redundancy can also render the system
fault-tolerant with respect to node failures and mitigate the
effect of packet losses. We remark that, as illustrated in [16],
the implementation of multi-path routing in a Wireless HART
device only requires a minor change which retains backward
compatibility with standard devices.
Paper contribution: Because of wireless networking, a
MCN can be subject to failures and/or malicious attacks. In
[5] we addressed and solved the problem of designing a set
of controllers and the communication protocol parameters of
a SISO MCN, so that it is possible to detect and isolate the
faulty nodes of the controllability and observability networks
and apply an appropriate controller to stabilize the system,
as depicted in Figure 1. In [21] and in this paper we extend
such investigation to MIMO MCNs: in particular, while in
[21] we extended the MCN formalism to MIMO LTI plants
and developed a procedure to guarantee the existence of a
stabilizing controller Ci for any node failure, in this paper
we provide conditions on network topology, scheduling and
routing that enable detection and isolation of node failures.
The extension with respect to the results in [5] is not
trivial: indeed in the MIMO case the geometric approach
exploited in [5] does not easily provide a relation between the
conditions that enable FDI of node failures and the network
topology, scheduling and routing. To overcome this issue
we exploit formalism and FDI methodologies of structured
systems [9]. This methodology leverages on the classical
observer-based results in [12], where the system with failures
is required to be left-invertible: therefore our results imply
that almost any failure signal can be detected and isolated.
In order to detect and isolate any non-zero failure signal we
should require input-observability. Indeed a carefully chosen
Fig. 1. Control scheme of a Multi-hop Control Network subject to link failures.
(malicious) failure may hide in the zero dynamics, being
therefore undetectable: for example in [23], [17] the role of
invariant zeros in detecting malicious attacks has
Related work: As can be inferred from the recent survey
[7], fault tolerant control and fault diagnosis is one of the
main issues addressed in the research on NCSs. However,
most of the existing literature does not consider the effect
of the communication protocol introduced by a Multi-hop
Control Network. In [4], a procedure to minimize the number
and cost of additional sensors, required to solve the FDI
problem for structured systems, is presented. In [20] the
design of an intrusion detection system is presented for a
Wireless Control Network: our work differs from such results
in the following four aspects. (1) In [13] the wireless network
is an autonomous system where the network itself acts as
a decentralized controller, while in our model the wireless
network transfers sensing and actuation data between a plant
and a centralized controller, namely it acts as a relay network.
This modeling choice is motivated by the fact that Wire-
lessHART and ISA-100 are designed for control loops where
a centralized controller exploits a wireless network to relay
sensing and actuation data, which is often a forced choice
in industrial environments. (2) As a consequence of the
previous issue, in [13] FDI is performed only exploiting the
output signal from a subset of communication nodes, while
we can exploit the input and output signals of the centralized
controller. (3) In our model we take into account the effect
of the scheduling ordering of the node transmissions in the
sensing and actuation data relay, which provides a more
accurate modeling of the effect of scheduling on the closed
loop dynamics. Indeed, the conditions we derive in Section V
show that, in order to guarantee FDI of faulty nodes, the link
scheduling order is irrelevant: this is an interesting result
because, as widely discussed in [6], [5], [22], it strongly
reduces the scheduling period, avoids the necessity of on-
the-fly scheduling re-definition, and always guarantees the
existence of an admissible scheduling when multiple loops
exploit the same communication network. (4) In [20] FDI
is performed by on-the-fly testing the rank of a number of
matrices which is a combinatorial function of the number
of communication links, while our method only requires to
apply a logic operator to a number of Luenberger observers
which is at most equal to the number of communication
nodes. To the best of our knowledge, our work is pioneering
in addressing FDI for a MCN that implements standardized
communication protocols. An extended version of this paper
can be found on ArXiv.
Notation: We will denote by N and R respectively the
sets of natural and real numbers. Given n ∈ N, we denote
by n the set n .= {1, 2, . . . , n}. We denote by 0n×m
the matrix of zeros with n rows and m columns and by
In the identity matrix of dimension n. Given a finite set
A and a subset B ⊆ A, we define |A| and |B| their
cardinality, A \ B the difference set and 2A the power set.
We denote by diag(F1(z), . . . , Fn(z)) the n × n diagonal
transfer function matrix whose diagonal consists of the scalar
transfer functions F1(z), . . . , Fn(z). Given a directed graph
(V , E) we define path an alternating sequence of vertices and
edges. A path is defined simple if no vertices are repeated.
We define a set of paths vertex disjoint if each two of them
consist of disjoint sets of vertices. We call a set of r disjoint
and simple paths from a set V1 ⊆ V to a set V2 ⊆ V an
r-linking from V1 to V2. We denote by
⊎
the disjoint union
operator among directed graphs. For a formal definition of
further graph properties and notations (e.g. weakly connected
graph, weakly connected component, bridge nodes etc.) the
reader is referred to [26].
II. MCN MODEL
We propose a mathematical framework for modeling
wireless multi-hop communication networks that implement
time-triggered protocols such as WirelessHART and ISA-
100. In these standards the access to the shared communica-
tion channel is specified as follows: time is divided into slots
of fixed duration ∆ and groups of Π time slots are called
frames of duration T = Π∆ (see Figure 2). For each frame,
a communication scheduling allows each node to transmit
data only in a specified time slot. The scheduling is periodic
with period Π, i.e. it is repeated in all frames.
T = DP
Cycle nCycle n−1 Cycle n+1
D
3 ... P-1 P 1 2 3 ... P 1 2 3 ...P-1
Fig. 2. Time-slotted structure of frames.
Definition 1: A MIMO Multi-hop Control Network is a
tuple M = (P , G,W, η,∆) where:
P is a continuous-time MIMO LTI system, with n, m and
ℓ respectively the dimensions of the internal state, input and
output spaces.
G = (GR, GO). GR = (VR, ER) is a directed graph,
where the vertices correspond to the communication nodes
of the network and an edge from v to v′ means that node
v′ can receive messages transmitted by node v through the
wireless communication link (v, v′). We denote by vu,c the
special node of VR that corresponds to the controller and
by vu,i ∈ VR, i ∈ m, the special nodes that correspond to
the actuators of the input components. GO = (VO, EO) is
defined similarly to GR. We denote by vy,c the special node
of VO that corresponds to the controller and by vy,i ∈ VO ,
i ∈ ℓ, the special nodes that correspond to the sensors of the
outputs yi, i ∈ ℓ.
W = (WR,WO). WR = {WRi}i∈m, where WRi :
ER → R is a weight function for the i-th input component
that associates to each link a real constant. WO = {WOi}i∈ℓ
is defined similarly to WR.
η = (ηR, ηO). ηR = {ηRi}i∈m, where ηRi : N →
2ER is the controllability scheduling function for the i-th
input component that associates to each time slot of each
frame a set of edges of the controllability radio connectivity
graph GR. Since in this paper we only consider a periodic
scheduling, that is repeated in all frames, we define the con-
trollability scheduling functions by ηRi : {1, . . . ,Π} → 2ER .
The integer constant Π is the period of the controllability
scheduling. The semantics of ηRi is that (v, v′) ∈ ηRi(h) if
at time slot h of each frame the data associated to the i-th
input component and contained in node v is transmitted to
the node v′, multiplied by the weight WRi(v, v′). For any
ηRi , we assume that each link can be scheduled only one
time for each frame1. ηO = {ηOi}i∈ℓ is defined similarly to
ηR.
2
∆ is the time slot duration. As a consequence, T = Π∆
is the frame duration.
The main difference with respect to the MCN definition given
in [15] for SISO systems is that here the network needs to
relay m actuation signals and ℓ sensor signals: we assume
that nodes routes data of each of these signals separately.
Designing a scheduling function induces a communication
scheduling (namely the time slot when each node is allowed
to transmit) and a multi-path routing (namely the set of
paths that convey data from the input to the output of the
connectivity graph) of the communication protocol. Since the
scheduling function is periodic, the induced communication
scheduling is periodic and the induced multi-path routing is
static.
Definition 2: Given GR and ηRi we define GR (ηRi(h))
the sub-graph of GR induced by keeping the edges scheduled
in the time slot h. We define GR(ηRi) =
⋃Π
h=1GR(ηRi(h))
the sub-graph of GR induced by keeping the union of edges
scheduled during the whole frame.
GR(ηRi) consists of a set of simple (routing) paths start-
ing from vu,c and terminating in vu,i. As a consequence
1This does not lead to loss of generality, since it is always possible to
obtain an equivalent model that satisfies this constraint by appropriately
splitting the nodes of the graph, as already illustrated in the memory slot
graph definition of [19].
2We remark that the scheduling period of ηO is the same of ηR.
GR(ηRi) is a directed, weakly connected and acyclic graph.
The above definition can be given similarly for GO and ηOi .
ZOH u(t) P(s) y(t)
P(z)
T
y(kT)R(z) u(kT)u(kT)
M(z)
O(z) y(kT)
Fig. 3. MCN interconnected system.
Nominal MCN: The dynamics of a MCN M can be
modeled by the interconnection of blocks as in Figure 3.
The block P is characterized by the discrete-time transfer
function matrix P(z) obtained by discretizing the system
P with sampling time T = Π∆. The block R models the
dynamics introduced by the flow of the actuation data of all
components of the control input u via the communication
network represented by GR. In order to define the dynamics
of R, we need to define the semantics of the data flow
through the network induced by the scheduling and the
weight functions. We assume that each communication node,
when scheduled to transmit by ηRi , computes a linear
combination of the data associated to the input component ui
and received from the incoming links according to the weight
function WRi . This linear combination is then transmitted
via the outgoing scheduled links. As in [21] the input/output
behavior of ui(kT ) with respect to u˜i(kT ) can be formal-
ized, for any i ∈m, by the following transfer function:
Ri(z)
.
=
U˜i(z)
Ui(z)
=
DRi∑
d=1
γRi(d)
zd
, (1)
where DRi ∈ N is the maximum delay introduced by the
(routing) paths of GR(ηRi) and ∀d ∈ DRi , γRi(d) ∈ R,
γRi(DRi) 6= 0. The reader is referred to [5], [22] for the
formal definition of the coefficients γRi(d), d ∈DRi , which
depend on the weight function WR.
The block R is characterized by the transfer function
matrix R(z) = diag(R1(z), . . . ,Rm(z)). The same holds
for the block O. The dynamics of a MIMO MCN M can
be modeled by the cascade of the transfer function matrices
R(z), P(z) and O(z), thus M(z) = O(z)P(z)R(z).
Faulty MCN: We assume that a failure or a malicious
attack associated to a communication node v ∈ VR can be
modeled by a set of arbitrary signals fv,i(k), for any i such
that there exist v′ ∈ VR, h ∈ Π with (v, v′) ∈ ηRi(h),
each summed to the i-th input component routed via node
v. This general framework, as illustrated in [5], models
several classes of failures (e.g. a node stops sending data
or sends fake data) and malicious attacks (e.g. an arbitrary
signal is injected, which overrides/sums to the original data).
Following the same reasoning as in the definition of Ri(z),
we can define the transfer function from fv,i(k) to ui(k) as
follows:
Fv,i(z)
.
=
Ui(z)
Fv,i(z)
=
Dv,i∑
d=1
γv,i(d)
zd
, (2)
where Dv,i ∈ N is the maximum delay introduced by the
(routing) paths from v to the actuator node vu,i and ∀d ∈
Dv,i, γv,i(d) ∈ R, with γv,i(Dv,i) 6= 0. By the properties of
GR(ηRi) it follows that ∀v ∈ VR, Dv,i ≤ DRi . The same
holds for the block O.
III. MCN STRUCTURED MODEL
To state conditions for FDI of failures and malicious
attacks on a node of a MCN we will exploit the formalism
of structured systems [9]. Given a system characterized by a
state space representation S = (A,B,C,D) we can define
the associated structured system by defining the matrices
Sλ = (Aλ, Bλ, Cλ, Dλ) so that each entry is either zero
(if the corresponding entry in the original matrix is zero) or
a free parameter (if the corresponding entry of the original
matrix is non-zero). For instance, consider a system S given
by A = [1, 2; 0, 0], B = [0, 1]⊤, C = [1, 0]: the correspond-
ing structured system Sλ is given by A = [λ1, λ2; 0, 0], B =
[0, λ3]
⊤
, C = [λ4, 0], where the λi’s are free parameters. A
structured system can also be represented by a directed graph
(VSλ , ESλ) whose vertices correspond to the input, state and
output variables, and with an edge between two vertices if
there is a non-zero free parameter λi relating the correspond-
ing variables in the equations. The graph representation of
the example above is given by VSλ = {u, x1, x2, y}, and
ESλ = {(x1, x1), (x2, x1), (u, x2), (x1, y)}.
The following proposition formalizes the graph structured
representation of the block R when a set of failure signals
is applied to communication nodes.
Proposition 1: Given GR, ηR and a set of faulty nodes
V¯ ⊆ VR we define the graph structured representation
(VRλ , ERλ) of the block R as follows:
VRλ
.
= {u1, . . . , um} ∪ {u˜1, . . . , u˜m} ∪
⋃
i ∈ m,
d ∈ DRi
{xi,d} ∪
⋃
v ∈ V¯ ,
i ∈ m
{fv,i},
∀i ∈ m,∀d ∈ DRi , (ui, xi,d) ∈ ERλ ⇔ γRi(d) 6= 0,
∀i ∈ m,∀d ∈ DRi ,∀v ∈ V¯ , (fv,i, xi,d) ∈ ERλ ⇔ γv,i(d) 6= 0,
∀i ∈ m,∀d1, d2 ∈ DRi , (xi,d1 , xi,d2) ∈ ERλ ⇔ d1 = d2 + 1,
∀i ∈ m, (xi,1, u˜i) ∈ ERλ .
Proof: By applying the principle of superposition to (1) and
(2) we derive, for each component i ∈ m of the input signal, a
state space representation
x˙i(t) = Aix(t) +Biui(t) +
∑
v∈V¯
Fifv,i(t),
u˜i(t) = Cixi(t)
of U˜i(z) = Ri(z)Ui(z) +
∑
v∈V¯
Fv,i(z)Fv,i(z). In particular, we
define x = [xi,1 . . . xi,DRi ]
⊤ and:
Ai =
[
0 IDRi−1
0 01×(DRi−1)
]
,
Bi =
[
γRi(1) · · · γRi(DRi)
]⊤
,
Fi =
[
γv,i(1) · · · γv,i(Dv,i)
]⊤
,
Ci =
[
1 0 · · · 0
]
. (3)
The result follows by definition of graph representation of a
structured system.
Figure 4 provides an example of the graph representation
of Rλ when a failure in the node v occurs. The γ’s labeling
Fig. 4. Graph representation of Rλ when a failure in the node v occurs.
some edges of ERλ just indicate that such edges are present
if and only if the corresponding γ’s are not equal to 0.
Note that (VRλ , ERλ) is composed by m weakly connected
components, each associated to the data flow of the i-th
input component. Also note that each node xi,d is a variable
associated to the i-th input component that will be delivered
with a delay d to the actuator node vu,i. Finally, note that
the sets of input and output nodes are respectively U .=
{u1, . . . , um} and U˜
.
= {u˜1, . . . , u˜m}.
The same holds for defining the structured graph repre-
sentation (VOλ , EOλ) of block O, where the sets of input
and output nodes are respectively Y˜ .= {y˜1, . . . , y˜ℓ} and
Y
.
= {y1, . . . , yℓ}.
Finally, let (VPλ , EPλ) be the structured graph representa-
tion of the plant P , where the sets of input and output nodes
are respectively U˜ .= {u˜1, . . . , u˜m} and Y˜
.
= {y˜1, . . . , y˜ℓ}.
The model of a MCN M is the cascade of the blocksR, P
and O. As a consequence, its structured graph representation
(VMλ , EMλ) is given by the union of the structured graph
representations of Rλ, Pλ and Oλ, and the set of nodes
U˜ and Y˜ represent the interconnection nodes among such
graphs. It is easy to see that all nodes in U˜ and Y˜ are (weak)
bridges of (VMλ , EMλ) since the removal of one of them
increases the number of weakly connected components.
IV. FDI OF FAILURES ON STRUCTURED SYSTEMS
Assumption 1: We assume in this section that fv,i(k) =
fv(k) for all i such that there exist v′ ∈ VR, h ∈ Π with
(v, v′) ∈ ηRi(h).
In other words, when a failure on a node v occurs, it
equally affects all the input components routed via v. This
assumption is satisfied when fv(k) models a node failure,
or when the malicious attack is not able to access separately
the input components. We will discuss the case when this
assumption does not hold in Section VI.
Let a structured system Sλ be given in the form:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k) + E1d(k) + F1f(k),
y(k) = Cx(k) +Du(k) + E2d(k) + F2f(k),
where d(k) is a vector of disturbance signals and f(k) =
[f1(k), . . . , fr(k)]
⊤ is a vector of r failure signals. In this
paper we will not consider the disturbance (i.e. E1 = E2 =
0) and leave such generalization to further work. In [3]
necessary and sufficient conditions have been derived on the
graph representation of Sλ that (generically) guarantee the
existence of a bank of Luenberger observers, which takes
as inputs u(k), y(k), generates as output the residual signals
vector fˆ(k) = [fˆ1(k), . . . , fˆr(k)]⊤ and is characterized by a
transfer function
 Fˆ1(z).
.
.
Fˆr(z)

 =

 T11(z) · · · 0.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 · · · Trr(z)



 F1(z).
.
.
Fr(z)

 ,
where ∀i ∈ r, Tii(z) 6= 0. Characterizing the existence of
such bank of observers is called the bank of observer-based
diagonal FDI problem. It is well known that the control input
effects can be taken into account in the observer structure,
therefore we will consider without loss of generality B =
D = 0. The theorem below characterizes the bank of
observer-based diagonal FDI problem when there are no
disturbances, and is a particular case of Theorem 3 in [3].
Theorem 2 (from Theorem 3 in [3]): The bank of
observer-based diagonal FDI problem is generically solvable
for a system S if and only if (i) S is structurally observable
and (ii) k = r, where k is the maximum number of
fault-output vertex disjoint paths in the graph representation
of Sλ.
V. FDI OF NODE FAILURES ON MCNS
Given a MCN M subject to failures on communication
nodes, if the bank of observer-based diagonal FDI problem
is generically solvable for node failures in Mλ, then the
residual signals can be used to detect and identify possibly
simultaneous occurrence of node failures. In [21] we proved
that, given a MIMO MCN M and if the plant P is control-
lable and observable, it is always possible to design a weight
function W such that M is controllable and observable. As
a consequence, we assume in this paper that Mλ always
satisfies Condition (i) of Theorem 2.
In order to design the network configuration of a MCN M
to enable FDI of node failures, as the main result of this paper
we state a formal relation between the network topology G
and scheduling/routing η of M, and solvability conditions
of the bank of observer-based diagonal FDI problem for
node failures. With this aim we first propose an algorithm
to construct a graph (V , E), which essentially consists of
the disjoint union of the controllability and observability
graphs associated to each schedule, and of the structured
graph representation of the plant. Then we will state a
formal relation between solvability conditions of the bank of
observer-based diagonal FDI problem for Mλ and (V , E).
Definition 3: Given a MCN M, we define a graph
(V,E) =
(
m⊎
i=1
GR(ηRi )
)⊎
(VPλ , EPλ )
⊎( ℓ⊎
i=1
GO(ηOi )
)
, (4)
with the addition of the following edges:
∀i ∈m, (vu,i, u˜i) ∈ E , (5)
∀i ∈ ℓ, (y˜i, vy,i) ∈ E . (6)
The disjoint union operator induces a map ΓR that associates
to each communication node v ∈ VR a set of m corre-
sponding vertices {v1, . . . , vm} ⊂ V , one for each graph
GR(ηRi), i ∈m. A map ΓO can be defined similarly.
Example 1: Consider a MCN M where the
plant is given by A = [1, 2; 0, 3], B =
C = I2, and GR = {vu,c, v1, v2, vu,1, vu,2},
GO = {vy,1, vy,2, v3, v4, vy,c}, ηR1 =
{(vu,c, v1), (v1, vu,1)}, ηO1 = {(vy,1, v3), (v3, vy,c)}, ηR2 =
{(vu,c, v1), (vu,c, v2), (v1, vu,2), (v2, vu,2)}, ηO2 =
{(vy,2, v4), (v4, vy,c)}. The corresponding graph (V , E)
constructed as in Definition 3 is depicted in Figure 5. It
is easy to see that ΓR(vu,c) = {vu,c,1, vu,c,2},ΓR(v1) =
{v1,1, v1,2} etc. Note that the nodes vu,1, vu,2, vy,1, vy,2
do not split in the disjoint union, since each of them only
belongs respectively to GR(ηR1), GR(ηR2), GO(ηO1),
GO(ηO2).
Fig. 5. Graph (V , E) of Example 1.
Lemma 3: Given a MCN M and a set {v1, . . . , vr} ⊆
VR ∪ VO of faulty nodes, then the bank of observer-based
diagonal FDI problem is generically solvable for node fail-
ures in Mλ if and only if there exists an r-linking from
{fv1 , . . . , fvr} to Y in (VMλ , EMλ). Proof: Straight-
forward by Theorem 2 and by definition of Mλ.
Theorem 4: Let a MCN M and the associated graph
(V , E) constructed as in Definition 3 be given. Given any
set {v1, . . . , vr} ⊆ VR ∪ VO , there exists an r-linking from
{fv1 , . . . , fvr} to Y in (VMλ , EMλ) if and only if there
exists an r-linking from a set {v¯1 ∈ Γ(v1), . . . , v¯r ∈ Γ(vr)}
to {vy,c,1, . . . , vy,c,ℓ} in (V , E).
Proof: (⇒) Consider a set of r nodes given by the
union of {vR1 , . . . , vRp} ⊆ VR and {vO1 , . . . , vOq} ⊆
VO , with p + q = r, and define F
.
= FR ∪ FO , where
FR = {fvR1 , . . . , fvRp} and FO = {fvO1 , . . . , fvOq }. If
there exists an r-linking from F to Y in (VMλ , EMλ), then
the following hold:
∃ a p-linking from FR to a set YR = {yi1 , . . . , yip} ⊆ Y,
(7)
∃ a q-linking from FO to a set YO = {yj1 , . . . , yjq} ⊆ Y,
(8)
YR ∩ YO = ∅, (9)
where {i1, . . . , ip} ⊆ ℓ and {j1, . . . , jq} ⊆ ℓ. Since in
(VMλ , EMλ) U˜ and Y˜ are bridge nodes and do not belong
to any cycle, (7) implies the following:
∃ a p-linking from FR to a set U˜R = {u˜k1 , . . . , u˜kp} ⊆ U˜ ,
(10)
∃ a p-linking from U˜R to a set Y˜R = {y˜i1 , . . . , y˜ip} ⊆ Y˜ ,
(11)
∃ a p-linking from Y˜R to YR, (12)
where {k1, . . . , kp} ⊆ m. By (10), (4) and for the sym-
metric weakly connected components structure of Rλi and
GR(ηRi), i ∈m, it follows that in (V , E)
∃ a p-linking from {vR1,k1 , . . . , vRp,kp} to {vu,k1 , . . . , vu,kp},
(13)
where ∀ϑ ∈ p, vRϑ,kϑ ∈ ΓR(vRϑ). By (5) it follows that
∃ a p-linking from {vu,k1 , . . . , vu,kp} to U˜R. (14)
By (11) and since (4) the structured graph representa-
tion (VPλ , EPλ) of the plant belongs both to (V , E) and
(VMλ , EMλ), it follows that
∃ a p-linking from U˜R to Y˜R. (15)
By (6) it follows that
∃ a p-linking from Y˜R to {vy,i1 , . . . , vy,ip}. (16)
By (12), (4) and for the symmetric weakly connected com-
ponents structure of Oλi and GO(ηOi), i ∈ ℓ, it follows that
∃ a p-linking from {vy,i1 , . . . , vy,ip} to {vy,c,i1, . . . , vy,c,ip}.
(17)
By (13), (14), (15), (16) and (17) it follows that
∃ a p-linking from {vR1,k1 , . . . , vRp,kp}
to {vy,c,i1 , . . . , vy,c,ip}. (18)
By (8), (4) and for the symmetric weakly connected com-
ponents structure of Oλi and GO(ηOi), i ∈ ℓ, it follows
that
∃ a q-linking from {vO1,j1 , . . . , vOq,jq}
to {vy,c,j1 , . . . , vy,c,jq}, (19)
where ∀ϑ ∈ q, vOϑ,iϑ ∈ ΓO(vOϑ). By (9),
(18) and (19) it follows that there exists an p +
q-linking in (V , E) from the p + q dimensional set
{vR1,i1 , . . . , vRp,ip , vO1,j1 , . . . , vOq,jq} to the p+ q dimen-
sional set {vy,c,i1, . . . , vy,c,ip , vy,c,j1 , . . . , vy,c,jq}. Since p+
q = r, this completes the proof.
(⇐) Consider a set of r nodes given by the union of
{vR1 , . . . , vRp} ⊆ VR and {vO1 , . . . , vOq} ⊆ VO , with
p + q = r, and let F .= FR ∪ FO, where FR =
{vR1,k1 , . . . , vRp,kp} ⊆ V and FO = {vO1,j1 , . . . , vOq,jq} ⊆
V , where {k1, . . . , kp} ⊆ m and {j1, . . . , jp} ⊆ ℓ. If there
exists an r-linking from F to {vy,c,1, . . . , vy,c,ℓ} in (V , E),
then the following hold:
∃ a p-linking from FR to a set {vy,c,i1 , . . . , vy,c,ip}, (20)
∃ a q-linking from FO to a set {vy,c,j1 , . . . , vy,c,jp}, (21)
{vy,c,i1 , . . . , vy,c,ip} ∩ {vy,c,j1, . . . , vy,c,jp} = ∅, (22)
where {i1, . . . , ip} ⊆ ℓ. By (5), (6), and since in (V , E) U˜
and Y˜ are bridge nodes that do not belong to any cycle, (20)
implies the following:
∃ a p-linking from FR to a set U˜R = {u˜Rk1 , . . . , u˜Rkp} ⊆ U˜ ,
(23)
∃ a p-linking from U˜R to a set Y˜R = {y˜Ri1 , . . . , y˜Rip} ⊆ Y˜ ,
(24)
∃ a p-linking from Y˜R to {vy,c,i1 , . . . , vy,c,ip}. (25)
By (23), (4) and for the symmetric weakly connected com-
ponents structure of Rλi and GR(ηRi), i ∈ m, it follows
that in (VMλ , EMλ)
∃ a p-linking from {vR1 , . . . , vRp} to U˜R. (26)
Reasoning as above for (26), by (24) and (25) it follows that
∃ a p-linking from U˜R to Y˜R, (27)
∃ a p-linking from Y˜R to YR = {yi1 , . . . , yip} ⊆ Y. (28)
By (26), (27) and (28) it follows that
∃ a p-linking from {vR1 , . . . , vRp} to YR. (29)
By (21), (4) and for the symmetric weakly connected com-
ponents structure of Oλi and GO(ηOi), i ∈ ℓ, it follows that
∃ a q-linking from {vO1 , . . . , vOq} to YO = {yj1 , . . . , yjp} ⊆ Y.
(30)
By (22), (29) and (30) it follows that there exists an p +
q-linking in (VMλ , EMλ) from the p + q dimensional set
{vR1 , . . . , vRp , vO1 , . . . , vOq} to the p + q dimensional set
YR ∪YO ⊆ Y . Since p+ q = r, this completes the proof.
The following corollary provides necessary and sufficient
conditions on network topology, scheduling and routing for
FDI of node failures over a MIMO MCN.
Corollary 5: Given a MCN M, the associated graph
(V , E) constructed as in Definition 3 and a set {v1, . . . , vr} ⊆
VR ∪ VO of faulty nodes, then the bank of observer-based
diagonal FDI problem is generically solvable for node fail-
ures in Mλ if and only if there exists an r-linking from
a set {v¯1 ∈ Γ(v1), . . . , v¯r ∈ Γ(vr)} to {vy,c,1, . . . , vy,c,ℓ}
in (V , E). Proof: Straightforward by Lemma 3 and
Theorem 4.
Example 2: Consider the MCN as in Example 1. It is
easy to see that the conditions of Corollary 5 are satisfied
for any 2-dimensional set of communication nodes, except
for (v2, v4). As a consequence, the FDI problem cannot be
solved for 2 simultaneous failures. However, by adding to
any time slot of the scheduling function ηR1 the transmission
of links (vu,c, v2) and (v2, vu,1), the conditions are satisfied
and we can detect and isolate up to 2 simultaneous failures.
An alternative solution is adding to the scheduling function
ηO1 the transmission of links (vy,1, v4) and (v4, vy,c). It is
interesting that, in order to guarantee FDI of faulty nodes,
the link scheduling order is irrelevant.
Example 2 shows that our results, for small graphs, can
be used to enable FDI by manual designing the graph
topology, scheduling and routing over the graph (V , E).
For more complex networks graph theory algorithms can
be exploited to automate the network design process, by
searching for disjoint paths for any tentative set of faulty
nodes in 2|VR|∪|VO|, which is characterized by an exponential
complexity. In the following we provide a sufficient condition
that is easier to be verified.
Lemma 6: [26] Let a graph (V , E) have connectivity r,
and let V1, V2 be subsets of V each of size at least r, then
there exists an r-linking from V1 to V2 (and vice versa).
Proposition 7: Given a MCN M and a positive integer
r ≥ min{m, ℓ}, let:
∀v ∈ VR, |ΓR(v)| ≥ r, (31)
(VPλ , EPλ) has connectivity ≥ r, (32)
∀v ∈ VO, |ΓO(v)| ≥ r. (33)
Then for any r-dimensional set of faulty nodes the bank of
observer-based diagonal FDI problem is generically solvable
for Mλ. Proof: Consider a set of r nodes given by
the union of {vR1 , . . . , vRp} ⊆ VR and {vO1 , . . . , vOq} ⊆
VO , with p + q = r. Let (V , E) be the graph constructed
as in Definition 3 from M, and let F .= FR ∪ FO,
where FR = {vR1,i1 , . . . , vRp,ip} ⊆ V and FO =
{vO1,j1 , . . . , vOq,jq} ⊆ V , where {i1, . . . , ip} ⊆ ℓ and
{j1, . . . , jp} ⊆ ℓ. By (31) it follows that there exists
a p-linking from FR to a set {vu,k1 , . . . , vu,kp}, where
{k1, . . . , kp} ⊆ m. By (5) and since r ≤ m it follows
that there exists a p-linking from {vu,k1 , . . . , vu,kp} to
{u˜k1 , . . . , u˜kp}. By (32) it follows that there exists a p-
linking from {u˜k1 , . . . , u˜kp} to {y˜i1 , . . . , y˜ip}. By (6) and
since r ≤ ℓ it follows that there exists a p-linking from
{y˜i1 , . . . , y˜ip} to a set {vy,i1 , . . . , vy,ip}. By (33) it follows
that there exists an r-linking from {vy,i1 , . . . , vy,ip}∪FO to a
set {vy,c,i1, . . . , vy,c,ip , vy,c,j1 , . . . , vy,c,jq}. For all the above
properties it follows that there exists an r-linking from F to
{vy,c,i1 , . . . , vy,c,ip , vy,c,j1 , . . . , vy,c,jq}. By Corollary 5, and
since p+ q = r, this completes the proof.
Conditions (31) and (33) can be verified in linear time with
respect to |VR|+ |VO|, but they are conservative. Indeed, it
is easy to see that, for the solutions proposed in Example 2
where the FDI problem is solvable for up to 2 simultaneous
failures, they are not satisfied. Condition (32) can be verified
by searching for disjoint paths on a graph characterized by
cardinality n + m + ℓ, and it is easy to show that it is a
necessary condition (i.e. by assuming that all r node failures
occur in the controllability network).
VI. REMOVING ASSUMPTION 1
If we do not impose Assumption 1 a failure on a node
v ∈ VR affects all the input components routed via v with
possibly different signals {fv,i(k)}i∈φ(v), where
φ(v)
.
= {i ∈m : (∃v′ ∈ VR, ∃h ∈ Π : (v, v
′) ∈ ηRi(h))}
represents the set of input components routed via v. In this
case, since we aim at isolating node failures, we are just
interested in detecting whether at least one of the signals
{fv,i(k)}i∈φ(v) is active. As a consequence the conditions
for solvability of the bank of observer-based diagonal FDI
problem can be defined as follows.
Lemma 8: Given a MCN M and a set V¯ =
{v1, . . . , vr} ⊆ VR ∪ VO of faulty nodes, define F¯ =⋃
v∈V¯
⋃
i∈φ(v)
{fv,i(k)} the set of all failure signals. The bank of
observer-based diagonal FDI problem is generically solvable
for node failures in Mλ if and only if, for any v¯ ∈ V¯
and any i¯ ∈ φ(v¯), there exists an r-linking from F¯ \⋃
i∈φ(v¯)\{i¯}
{fv¯,i(k)} to Y in (VMλ , EMλ). Proof: By
applying the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 3
in [3] it can be stated that, given v¯ ∈ V¯ and i¯ ∈ φ(v¯),
an r-linking exists from F¯ \
⋃
i∈φ(v¯)\{i¯}
{fv¯,i(k)} to Y in
(VMλ , EMλ) if and only if it is possible to design an
observer that generates a signature fˆv¯,¯i(k) characterized by
a non-zero transfer function with respect to fv¯,¯i(k), a zero
transfer function with respect to any failure signal in the set
F¯ \
⋃
i∈φ(v¯)\{i¯}
{fv¯,i(k)}, and a (possibly zero or non-zero)
transfer function with respect to any failure signal in the set⋃
i∈φ(v¯)\{i¯}
{fv¯,i(k)}. Therefore, the signature fˆv¯,¯i(k) is not
affected by the failure signals of any other node v 6= v¯,
and is (generically) non-zero if fv¯,¯i(k) is non-zero. As a
consequence, we can detect and isolate a failure acting on
node v¯ when at least one signature fˆv¯,i(k), i ∈ φ(v¯) is non-
zero. This completes the proof.
Proposition 9: Given a MCN M and 2 faulty nodes
v1, v2 ∈ VR, the bank of observer-based diagonal FDI prob-
lem is generically solvable for node failures in Mλ only if
φ(v1)∩φ(v2) = ∅. Proof: Assume that φ(v1)∩φ(v2) =
{k} ∈m, and let v¯ = v1, i¯ = k. In the graph (VMλ , EMλ)
there does not exist a 2-linking from {fv1,k, fv2,k} to Y
since they only have outgoing links to the weakly connected
component Rλ,k of the structured graph representation of
the block R (see Figure 4). As a consequence, the maximal
linking from F¯ \
⋃
i∈φ(v1)\{k}
{fv1,i(k)} to Y in (VMλ , EMλ)
is k = 1. Since r = 2 the results follows.
The above proposition can be proven similarly for the
observability graph and shows that, if Assumption 1 is not
raised, the bank of observer-based diagonal FDI problem is
generically solvable for node failures in Mλ only for trivial
network topologies, namely when all graphs GR(ηRi), i ∈
m and GO(ηOi), i ∈ ℓ consist of a single communication
node (namely, they are not multi-hop networks). This can
be easily seen by considering that, for any 2 nodes v1, v2
belonging to a given GR(ηRk), k ∈ φ(v1) ∩ φ(v2). This
negative result is intuitive: if a malicious attack is able
to access separately the input components and to inject
unrelated signals to each of them, it is much more difficult
to exploit redundancy to perform FDI. To overcome this
difficulty an interesting venue for future work is providing
milder conditions that enable to detect and isolate failures of
clusters of nodes, instead of isolating singleton node failures.
In particular, it would be interesting to compute for a given
MCN the minimal node clustering that enables FDI.
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